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Abstract 
This study examines rape myth use in eight English rape trials and assesses attempts by trial 
participants to combat it. Trial notes, based on observations, were analyzed using thematic 
analysis. Rape myths were used in three identifiable ways: to distance the case from the 
͞ƌeal ƌape͟ steƌeotǇpe, to disĐƌedit the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt, aŶd to eŵphasize the aspects of the 
case that were consistent with rape myths. Prosecution challenges to the myths were few, 
and judges rarely countered the rape myths. This study provides new insights by 
demonstrating the ways that rape myths are utilized to manipulate juƌoƌs͛ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs of 
the evidence. 
 
Introduction 
Rape myths are widely held but false beliefs about rape, the nature of it, and the 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes suƌƌouŶdiŶg it. TheǇ haǀe ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as ͞pƌejudiĐial, steƌeotǇped, oƌ 
false beliefs about rape, rape ǀiĐtiŵs, aŶd ƌapists͟ ;Burt, 1980, p. 217). It has been widely 
recognized that false assumptions about rape and sexual assault are dangerous in the legal 
context as they have the potential to influence decision-making (Ellison & Munro, 2009a; 
Judicial Studies Board [JSB], 2010; Temkin & Krahé, 2008). Although Reece (2013) has 
recently criticized this view, her argument has been robustly challenged (Conaghan & 
Russell, 2014). The purpose of the research on which this article is based was to find out 
whether the use of rape mythology could still be found in modern rape trials and, if so, to 
examine the nature of its use and attempts made by trial participants to combat it. 
The academic study of rape myths has a long history (e.g., Burt, 1980), but a recent 
defiŶitioŶ eŵphasizes ďoth the ĐoŶteŶt aŶd fuŶĐtioŶ of these ŵǇths: ͞desĐƌiptiǀe oƌ 
prescriptive beliefs about sexual aggression (i.e., about its scope, causes, context, and 
consequences) that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexually aggressive behavior that men 
Đoŵŵit agaiŶst ǁoŵeŶ͟ ;Gerger, Kley, Bohner, & Siebler, 2007, p. 423). Examples include 
beliefs that the only genuine rape is violent rape by a complete stranger, that complaints of 
rape are generally false, and that true victims report to the police immediately. Of course, 
some rapes are committed by strangers and do involve violence, some reports of rape are 
false, and some victims do report to the police immediately. However, myths involve 
generalizations about all rapes and therein lies the problem. To those who believe in them, 
few allegations will ever qualify as real rape. 
In England, the use of rape myths in court was identified in two key observational 
studies (Adler, 1987; Lees, 1996). These studies found that defense barristers1 drew on a 
wide range of rape myths. They were used to undermine the credibility of the 
complainant, to blame her for the assault, and to make her appear unworthy of the 
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protection of the law. Subsequently, legislative changes were introduced, which were 
designed to afford complainants more protection from questioning about their sexual 
histoƌǇ ;s.ϰϭ Youth JustiĐe aŶd CƌiŵiŶal EǀideŶĐe AĐt ϭϵϵϵ ;heŶĐefoƌth s.ϰϭͿ aŶd ͞ďad 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͟ ;s.ϭϬϬ CƌiŵiŶal JustiĐe AĐt [CJA], ϮϬϬϯͿ. The defiŶitioŶs of ƌape aŶd ĐoŶseŶt 
were also revised (Sexual Offences Act [SOA], 2003). S.41 requires that a written 
application be made to the judge before evidence can be admitted about the 
ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt͛s past seǆual histoƌǇ. This ŵust speĐifǇ pƌeĐiselǇ the aspeĐts of the 
ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt͛s sexual history it is sought to explore and the grounds for doing so. The 
judge may approve the application only in a very restricted set of circumstances set out in 
the legislation (see Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, 2006 for further details). Kelly et al. (2006) 
examined the operation of s.41, and concluded that sexual history evidence was still being 
introduced frequently without the necessary application to the judge, while other rape 
myths not subject to the restrictions of s.41 were being increasingly mobilized. Reference 
to rape myth usage by both barristers and judges is also made by Smith and Skinner (2012) 
who conducted a more recent observational study. 
Research has repeatedly shown that rape myths can be influential in the perception of 
consent and rape (Frese, Moya, & Megías, 2004; Gray, 2015), as they provide a schema that 
shapes expectations of what is or is not considered to be rape (Bohner, Eyssel, Pina, Siebler, & 
Viki, 2009). Although jurors have the opportunity to engage in careful, systematic processing 
of the evidence presented (Chaiken, 1980), this is not sufficient to ensure that their verdict is 
accurate or unbiased. Factors such as lack of knowledge about rape and the relative ease of 
relying on pre-existing beliefs about rape are likely to encourage quicker and less effortful 
heuristic processing (Chaiken, 1980; Temkin & Krahé, 2008). Moreover, regardless of the 
depth of processing employed, jurors may selectively process the evidence in line with their 
pre-existing beliefs about rape (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). Thus, when defense 
counsel (DC) employ rape myths, they are reinforcing the beliefs of those who believe in those 
myths, while also potentially raising doubt in the minds of those who generally do not. 
Rape myths have a notable effect on mock jury discussions of rape cases (Ellison & 
Munro, 2009a). They can also obstruct attempts to educate mock jurors as to the reality of 
rape (Ellison & Munro, 2009b). Research has shown that those who believe in rape myths 
are more likely to find the defendant not guilty, to believe that the complainant 
consented, and to place at least some of the blame for the events upon the complainant 
(e.g., Frese et al., 2004; Gray, 2006; Hammond, Berry, & Rodriguez, 2011). 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)2 has identified a number of common rape myths and, 
ǁhile it ƌeĐogŶizes that the defeŶse has a dutǇ to ĐhalleŶge the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s aĐĐouŶt, it states that 
pƌoseĐutoƌs ͞ǁill ƌoďustlǇ ĐhalleŶge suĐh attitudes iŶ the Đouƌtƌooŵ͟ ;CP“, ϮϬϭϮ, p. ϭϱͿ. It also 
asserts that prosecutors will object to inappropriate defense cross-examination regarding the 
ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt͛s seǆual histoƌǇ aŶd to ͞allegatioŶs aďout the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ oƌ deŵeaŶouƌ of the 
ǀiĐtiŵ ǁhiĐh aƌe iƌƌeleǀaŶt to the issues iŶ the Đase͟ ;CP“, ϮϬϭϮ, p. ϯϰͿ. Effoƌts to improve the 
prosecution of rape in this way are by no means new as specialist training for rape 
prosecutors was introduced in 2007 (CPS, 2012). However, publications such as the Joint CPS 
and Police Action Plan on Rape (2014), which emphasizes that the focus for investigators and 
prosecutors should be the behavior of the defendant rather than that of the complainant, and 
the report by Angiolini (2015) suggest that this training has not been adequately 
implemented. Based on the analysis of CPS case files, Angiolini (2015) observed that rape 
myths were on occasion influential in CPS decision-making, and that there was little evidence 
of the prosecution discussing strategies to combat these myths. 
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In addition to possible challenges from the prosecution, judges in England and Wales are 
now able to give directions to the jury regarding the danger of relying on stereotyped beliefs 
about rape (JSB, 2010), although they are not obliged to do so. Given greater understanding 
about the malign effects of rape myths and the attempts made to see that they are disputed 
in court, it might have been expected that their usage would be declining. The purpose of 
this study was, therefore, to observe a small sample of rape trials to identify whether rape 
mythology figured in them and, if it did, to obtain a deeper understanding of the way in 
which rape stereotypes were deployed and challenged. 
Method 
Design 
The study employed an observational design together with qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with some of the barristers appearing in the observed cases. This article focuses 
on the trial observations, with the main analysis of the interviews to be reported elsewhere. 
Official recordings are made of trials conducted in the courts of England and Wales but 
these are not routinely transcribed. Transcription costs are very high and researchers are 
not allowed to use recording equipment in court. Trial observation and manual note-taking 
was therefore selected as the means to record detailed information about the trials. 
 
Table 1. Complainant/Defendant Relationship and Verdict, by Trial. 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
Relationshi
p 
Strange
r 
Previous 
relationsh
ip 
Marrie
d 
Previous 
relations
hip 
Acquainted
a 
Previous 
relations
hip 
Acquainte
da 
Acquainte
da 
Verdict Guilty Trial 
abandon
ed. 
Retrial 
ordered 
Guilty Not guilty No verdict: 
Jury 
disagreem
ent 
Not guilty Guilty Not guilty 
Note. T = trial. 
aConsidered as acquaintances, but the complainant met the defendant for the first time on 
the occasion of the rape itself. 
Trial Observations 
The study involved observation of eight single perpetrator rape trials including one 
attempted rape, at the end of 2010. The trials took place in several different Crown Courts3 
in London and the southeast of England. Each week throughout the data collection period, 
telephone calls were made to all the courts in the study area to establish whether any single 
perpetrator rape trials were listed for the following week, and to obtain any preliminary 
information about the nature of the case. For most weeks, there was only one relevant trial 
scheduled, but if there was more than one, then the case scheduled to last for no more than 
5 days was selected. 
The study sample consisted of alleged rapes by one stranger, three acquaintances, one 
husband, and three previous partners. The term stranger has been used where there has 
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been no previous interaction of any sort between complainant and defendant. 
Acquaintance has been used where there has been some limited interaction before the 
alleged rape. The relationship between the complainant and defendant and the verdict for 
the eight trials are shown in Table 1. 
Procedure 
Detailed contemporaneous notes, using a form of shorthand, were taken by the third author 
throughout seven of the trials, and then typed up during trial breaks and at the end of the 
day. In Trial 1, the second and third authors conducted the observation and separately took 
notes. The notes were subsequently compared and the adequacy of this method of trial 
recording was confirmed. Although not quite a verbatim transcript, the notes provide a very 
full account of the trials, with direct quotes noted where particularly relevant. In one trial, the 
judge refused to allow note-taking in the courtroom. Notes were therefore made during the 
frequent trial breaks and these were supplemented with notes taken by prosecuting counsel 
(PC) in the case. The third author had approached PC to request an interview with her for the 
study. Aware of the judge͛s eŵďaƌgo, PC offeƌed the thiƌd authoƌ heƌ Ŷotes. As these ǁeƌe 
extremely detailed including verbatim quotes, they proved to be a useful addition to the 
existing material. 
Analytic Approach 
Inductive thematic analysis was conducted in accordance with the procedures suggested by 
Braun and Clarke (2006). As the analysis focuses on observed practice in the courts, the 
analysis was carried out at the semantic level, taking a realist perspective. That is, no attempt 
was made in this analysis to include latent conceptualizations of rape myths nor to explore a 
social constructionist interpretation of the data. 
The first stage of the analysis entailed identifying whether rape myths were used in the 
trials, and if so which myths were present. Identifying rape myth usage is not 
unproblematic. DC has a duty to represent the defendant and to put forward his case as 
strongly as possible, which can frequently entail a robust cross-examination of the 
complainant. A conservative approach toward the identification of myth use was adopted, 
allowing the most leeway to counsel and only classifying myth use as occurring when 
counsel expressly made generalizations about rape, rape victims, or rape defendants, which 
were false or where such false generalizations were clearly implicit in the argument. 
Having identified the myths in use, analysis was then carried out to explore whether there 
were conceptually discrete ways in which they were deployed. The myths were grouped into 
initial conceptual themes, which were reviewed and checked back to the original trial notes to 
ensure accuracy. From this iterative analytic process, there emerged two overarching themes, 
reflecting on one hand the way rape myths were deployed by DC and, on the other, how the 
myths were challenged. These two overarching themes divided themselves into subthemes. 
Thus, the deployment of rape myths by DC is subdivided into three subthemes, namely, the use 
of the real rape stereotype, the use of myths purely to discredit the complainant, and the use of 
myths that relate specifically to the facts of the case. Challenges to rape myths are subdivided 
into two subthemes, namely, prosecution challenges and judicial interventions and directions. 
Analysis 
Defense Use of Rape Myths 
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The study found that myth use was frequent. Across the course of the eight trials, the 
defense had recourse to a remarkably wide range of myths as is illustrated in Table 2. All 
have been previously identified in the literature of rape mythology (e.g., Payne, Lonsway, & 
Fitzgerald, 1999; Temkin & Krahé, 2008). The myths were used in subtly different, if 
overlapping, ways and, as mentioned above, three themes were identified. In Theme 1, DC 
draws on the stereotype of what happens before, during, and after a ͞ƌeal ƌape,͟ 
highlighting the elements of it that are missing in the case in question, with the aim of 
ĐastiŶg douďt oŶ the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s allegatioŶs. IŶ Theŵe Ϯ, ƌape ŵǇths aƌe used to disĐƌedit 
the complainant, focusing on her character and background. In Theme 3, rape myths 
relating to the specific facts of the case are mobilized. 
Theŵe 1: The ͞real rape͟ stereotype as the staŶdard. The classic stereotype of a genuine 
rape is a violent sexual attack by a stranger (Temkin & Krahé, 2008), where the victim does 
all she can to resist, incurring injury and/or torn clothes in the process, and immediately 
reporting the matter to the police. In Theme 1, DC invokes this stereotype and then 
attempts to distance the case in hand from it by pointing to the relationship between the 
parties, however tenuous, and emphasizing the absence of injuries,  
 
Table 2. A ͞Map͟ of DefeŶse MǇths aŶd JudiĐial DiƌeĐtioŶs, ďǇ Tƌial. 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8 
No. of myths used by 
defense 
3 4 6 6 5 7 6 1 
Lack of injury/torn 
clothes 
 ✓   ✓ ✓a   
Failure to resist   ✓a    ✓ ✓a 
Absence of 
immediate 
complaint 
  ✓a  ✓a    
Rape complainants 
are commonly liars 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Sexual history  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓a  
Previous allegations 
of rape suggest 
fabrication 
✓   ✓     
Rape is an easy 
allegation to make 
;Hale͛s diĐtuŵͿ 
  ✓   ✓   
Rape by former 
partner/husband is 
not really rape 
 ✓ ✓a ✓  ✓a   
Real victims of 
marital rape leave 
the marital home 
  ✓      
Sex offenders are 
different from 
ordinary people 
   ✓   ✓  
  7 
CoŵplaiŶaŶt͛s 
clothing may 
precipitate rape 
     ✓a   
Kissing as consent    ✓ ✓  ✓a  
Post-rape 
behavior/demeanor 
in court 
✓    ✓a ✓ ✓  
aIndicates that the judge gave a direction in response to the myth. 
resistance, torn clothes, and immediate reporting. The defense is therefore focusing not on 
what happened but rather on what did not happen and thereby suggesting that rape is 
unlikely to have taken place. 
Statistics for England and Wales show that only 14% of serious sexual offences involve a 
stranger attack (Office for National Statistics [ONS], 2013). Moreover, it is a myth both that 
rape necessarily involves injury or torn clothing and that where force is used, this will always 
leave a trace by way of marks or bruising. Victims of rape may well suffer no genital or other 
physical injury (Bowyer & Dalton, 1997; Sugar, Fine, & Eckert, 2004). Yet these myths 
featured strongly in two of the eight trials (5 and 6) and were also present in Trial 2. In Trial 
6, the defense referred 3 times to absence of injury. The complainant (henceforth C) was 
asked in cross-examination whether she had suffered injuries to her genital region or to the 
ƌest of heƌ ďodǇ. “he said that she had Ŷot. IŶ heƌ ĐlosiŶg speeĐh to the juƌǇ, DC said ͞C said 
that D had used force to prise her legs apart, force to pull her shoulder down yet she had no 
injuries at all, no red marks.͟ Thus, DC ǁas ƌelǇiŶg oŶ the false idea that aŶǇ foƌĐe 
necessarily entails injury and that without force or injury real rape has not occurred. 
IŶ additioŶ to the ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt foƌ iŶjuƌǇ, the ͞ƌeal ƌape͟ steƌeotǇpe also iŶĐludes the 
expectation that genuine victims will always employ one or more of a number of avoidance or 
resistance strategies. This bears no relationship to reality, and fails to account both for the fact 
that victims are often terrified that struggle will lead to injury or death and for the paralyzing 
effect of fear on the ability to shout or get away (Rape Crisis, n.d.). It also fails to account for the 
strength differential between most men and women. 
The avoidance/resistance myth featured in three trials (3, 7, and 8). In Trial 7, C, when 
drunkenly making her way home, met a stranger, D, whom she allowed into her flat. There 
he allegedly raped her. She was questioned by DC as to why she did not ask him to leave 
and failed to fight back, yell, swear, or resist: ͞At Ŷo poiŶt did Ǉou saǇ ͚get the fuĐk out of 
heƌe as ŵǇ flatŵate is iŶ his ƌooŵ aŶd he͛ll Đoŵe aŶd ďeat Ǉou up?͛ Did Ǉou Ŷeǀeƌ oŶĐe Ǉell 
oƌ sǁeaƌ?͟ There were five questions to this effect. C explained that she was afraid he was 
going to kill her and her strategy was to go along with what he wanted. In her closing 
speech, DC reiterated the point: ͞Would a ǀiĐtiŵ Ŷot at least sĐƌeaŵ oƌ do soŵethiŶg to 
show some kind of resistance? . . . She did not offer any resistance whatsoever to get rid of 
hiŵ.͟ 
Victims of rape rarely report to the police right away (see, on this, R v. Valentine 1996), 
and many never report to the police at all (Ministry of Justice [MJ], Home Office [HO], & the 
ONS, 2013). Some are reluctant to mention the matter to anybody (Stewart, Dobbin, & 
Gatowski, 1996). The myth that genuine rape victims will report immediately was invoked 
particularly in two trials (3 and 5). In Trial 3 there was some delay before C reported to 
anyone that she had been repeatedly raped by her husband. DC cross-examined C and two 
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witnesses at great length about this, implying that genuine victims report immediately. In 
her closing speech DC claimed that the delay suggested C was lying. 
Even in an adversarial system, it is hard to justify the use of Theme 1 mythology. Cross-
eǆaŵiŶatioŶ aďout the aďseŶĐe of featuƌes ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith the steƌeotǇpe of a ͞ƌeal ƌape͟ 
serves no other purpose than to mislead the jury. DC utilizes these ideas to encourage the jury 
to distaŶĐe the eǀeŶts fƌoŵ the steƌeotǇped iŵage of a ͞ƌeal ƌape.͟ Hoǁeǀeƌ, it is of Ŷo 
significance that C was uninjured, that her clothing was undamaged, or that she failed to resist 
unless there is specific evidence that suggests that such a result would have been expected in 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
Theme 2: Myths used purely to discredit the complainant. In Theme 2, stereotypes were 
used as part of a concerted attempt to discredit the complainant by focusing on her history, 
psychology, or character. 
A common myth is that rape allegations are frequently or even generally false. However, 
the CPS has recently pointed out that there are many prosecutions for sexual offences but it 
has had occasion to prosecute very few complainants for making false allegations (CPS, 
2013). Nonetheless, this myth featured in three trials (1, 2, and 3), and there was some 
reference to it in Trials 4, 5, 6, and 7. In pursuance of this myth, DC in Trials 3 and 6 were not 
aďoǀe haƌkiŶg ďaĐk to Loƌd JustiĐe Hale͛s disĐƌedited ϭϳth-ĐeŶtuƌǇ diĐtuŵ that ƌape ͞is aŶ 
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved and harder to be defended by the party 
aĐĐused tho Ŷeǀeƌ so iŶŶoĐeŶt͟ ;HaleϭPC ϲϯϱͿ. IŶ heƌ ĐlosiŶg speeĐh iŶ Tƌial 6, DC said, 
Unfortunately, the experience of the courts is that false allegations of this type are 
made, sadly regularly made, and are made for all sorts of reasons. Allegations are quite 
easy to make: You only have to say it and it has to be investigated. 
This theme was even taken up by the judge in the case, who reiterated that ͞sexual 
allegatioŶs aƌe easǇ to ŵake ďut diffiĐult to ƌefute.͟ It is ǁell estaďlished todaǇ that ƌape is a 
very difficult allegation to make and, as noted above, most rapes are not reported to the 
police (MJ, HO, & ONS, 2013). Contrary to the adage, as the burden of proof is on the 
prosecution and not on the defense, it is an allegation that is hard to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt. Conviction rates for rape testify to this, which show that only about 7% of 
rapes recorded by the police in England and Wales result in a conviction (MJ, HO, & ONS, 
2013). 
In Trial 1, involving attempted rape by a complete stranger, the prosecution had a very 
strong case as, unusually, the incident had been directly observed by two excellent 
independent witnesses. Arguing that the witnesses were mistaken and that C was lying about 
what had happened, DC successfully applied to the judge to cross-examine C about her 
alleged bad character (s.100 CJA). A very lengthy cross-examination ensued taking in every 
aspeĐt of C͛s past. C, it ǁas Đlaiŵed, ǁas a ǀioleŶt dƌuŶk, a ǁoŵaŶ of ďad ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ǁho had 
made previous rape allegations and whose word about what had happened could not 
therefore be trusted. While DC could not be faulted for attempting to do the best for her 
client, this heavy-handed character assassination, which was deeply distressing for the 
complainant, seems in the circumstances of the case hard to justify. It proved to be of no avail 
as D was convicted. 
IŶ ďoth Tƌials ϱ aŶd ϳ, C͛s dƌuŶkeŶŶess at the tiŵe of the alleged ƌape ǁas used ďǇ DC to 
argue that she was lying and had consented when drunk but regretted it later. In such 
circumstances, according to the leading case of R v. Bree (2007), her claim of rape would be 
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invalid as consent given when drunk is still considered to be consent (see Wallerstein, 2009, 
for a critique). Research shows the pervasiveness of the myth that women who give their 
consent when drunk will often cry rape afterwards (e.g., Gunby, Carline, & Beynon, 2012). 
DC͛s asseƌtioŶs ǁeƌe theƌefoƌe likelǇ to stƌike a Đhoƌd ǁith the juƌǇ. IŶ Tƌial ϱ, C ǁas ǁalkiŶg 
home at night when D, who was standing at a bus stop, started talking to her, followed her 
home and made his way into her house where he allegedly raped her. DC described the 
alleged ƌape as ͞a slightlǇ eŵďaƌƌassiŶg seǆual eŶĐouŶteƌ poƌtƌaǇed as ƌape.͟ He suggested 
to C, ͞You ďehaǀed a little out of ĐhaƌaĐteƌ afteƌ haǀiŶg a feǁ dƌiŶks aŶd ǁeƌe a ďit 
embarrassed afteƌǁaƌds.͟ But DC did not seek to explain why, if embarrassment was the 
motive for a false allegation of anal rape, C would have wished to go through with a police 
investigation and public trial. 
Research has found that sexual history evidence is influential with juries (Mason, Riger, & 
Foley, 2004). As noted above, s.41 requires that a written application be made to the judge 
ďefoƌe eǀideŶĐe ĐaŶ ďe adŵitted aďout C͛s past seǆual histoƌǇ. Despite this, the studǇ fouŶd 
that C͛s seǆual histoƌǇ ǁith thiƌd parties was introduced in four of the trials (2, 4, 6, and 7) 
without any s.41 application to admit it. There was scant evidence of any judicial attempts 
to stop this happening or to require the editing of video-recorded police interviews 
containing sexual history evidence. 
In Trial 2, DC applied pre-trial to cross-examine C about her sexual relationships with other 
parties, and after C gave her evidence in chief the judge told DC to apply in writing under s.41. 
The judge commented to the researcher after the trial was adjourned that the defense was 
doiŶg its utŵost to haǀe C͛s pƌeǀious seǆual ƌelatioŶships ďƌought out iŶ Đouƌt aŶd he ǁas Ŷot 
goiŶg to alloǁ this to happeŶ. Despite the judge͛s good iŶteŶtioŶs, ďefoƌe aŶǇ ǁƌitteŶ 
application was made, DC still managed to cross-examine C about a previous rape by a Black 
man [sic] with a gun, which he claimed had taken place but which C denied. The judge did not 
intervene at this stage but later on in the trial, he sent the jury out and reprimanded DC for the 
͞ďadgeƌiŶg͟ stǇle of his Đƌoss-examination. 
In Trial 4, although a s.41 application had been made, which covered previous allegations 
ďǇ C of seǆual aďuse ďǇ heƌ fatheƌ, it did Ŷot Đoǀeƌ C͛s pƌeǀious ƌelatioŶships ǁith otheƌ ŵeŶ. 
Nonetheless, in contravention of s.41, DC asked her about two older men she had had 
relationships with to show she was not averse to having sex with older men like D who was 20 
years older than she was. She was also questioned about her sexual relationship with another 
man during her on/off relationship with D. There was no judicial intervention to prevent these 
lines of questioning. 
In Trial 6, C alleged that she had been raped by a former partner with whom she had 
previously had an on/off relationship. In her video-recorded police interview, C had described 
the sexual nature of this relationship. The judge decided that, as the jury would see this 
interview, there was no need for a s.41 application which would, in any case, have been 
successful. However, in addition to exploring in depth C͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith D, DC, iŶ ďlataŶt 
contravention of s.41, questioned her about her relationships with other men when she was 
not seeing D. Instead of cutting off this line of cross-examination, remarkably, the judge 
himself questioned her about this matter, reiterating to the court that she had had a 
ƌelatioŶship ǁith soŵeoŶe else duƌiŶg oŶe of these ͞off peƌiods.͟ Quite apaƌt fƌoŵ the 
irrelevance and highly prejudicial nature of this questioning about sex with third parties, it 
should not have been permitted outside a s.41 application. 
Again, in Trial 7, C had been asked in her police interview about her previous sexual 
experience with others. As a result, her sexual history was revealed when the video recording 
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of the interview (see Achieving Best Evidence, MJ, 2011), was shown unedited in court. In the 
aďseŶĐe of aŶǇ s.ϰϭ appliĐatioŶ, ďoth pƌoseĐutioŶ aŶd defeŶse theŶ ƌefeƌƌed to C͛s seǆual 
experience. In her closing speech, DC said that C was ͞a ŵuĐh oldeƌ, ĐoŶfideŶt ǁoŵaŶ, 
worldly-wise who had had a lot of sex and knew what she wanted . . . C and D had one thing in 
common—theiƌ attitude to seǆ aŶd oŶe Ŷight staŶds.͟ But, DC added, she was not asking the 
juƌǇ to judge C͛s ͞pƌoŵisĐuous seǆ life.͟ 
AŶotheƌ attaĐk oŶ the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt͛s ĐƌediďilitǇ Đame through reliance on the myth that 
a previous allegation of rape indicates that the complainant is lying. This occurred in two 
trials (1 and 4). It relies on the idea that it is highly unlikely that a person would have been 
raped or abused more than once. Evidence, however, shows that victims of rape or sexual 
assault have frequently had this experience previously (e.g., Myhill & Allen, 2002). 
In Trial 4, DC applied under s.41 to cross-examine C about her previous allegations of rape 
and sexual abuse. The judge decided that there was no evidence that these allegations were 
false. He gave permission for one question only to be asked about them in relation to a panic 
attack that C had suffered after the alleged rape. However, DC managed to refer 5 times to 
these previous allegations of sexual assault. In her closing speech, she reminded the jury at 
some length that C had previously made three separate allegations against three separate 
males. While this was supposedly relevant to the panic attack, it inevitably invoked this myth. 
The judge made no attempt to intervene at any stage. 
Section 41 ǁas iŶtƌoduĐed to deal ǁith highlǇ pƌejudiĐial ŵǇths ƌelatiŶg to C͛s past seǆual 
history. In response to the study by Kelly et al. (2006), which demonstrated flaws in the 
operation of s.41, steps were taken to tighten procedures and to require written applications 
pre-trial (see MJ, Criminal Procedure Rules, Part 36). But the present small study suggests that 
s.41 is still not operating as it should. As legal restrictions are ignored, myths about sexual 
history are permitted to enter the courtroom. 
It is not unusual in criminal trials for attempts to be made to discredit witnesses. Indeed, 
this is an accepted part of the defense role. However, as seen in Trial 1, this can involve a 
sustained onslaught of vilification. In Theme 2, the reliance on myths to discredit C and 
make her appear deserving of her fate, an unworthy woman or a liar, is, it is argued, hard to 
justify. 
Theme 3: Invocation of myths in relation to the specific facts of the case. In this theme, the 
most frequently used, the actual facts of the case are used as a platform for the invocation 
of stereotypes. It goes without saying that counsel cannot be criticized for discussing the 
facts of the case, for example, that C and D were married, were former partners, or had 
engaged in kissing before the event in question. The fault lies in invoking false ideas in 
relation to those facts and inviting false conclusions from them. 
A prevalent myth drawn on by DC in four of these trials (2, 3, 4, and 6) was that marital 
rape, rape by a former partner, or rape by someone with whom C has previously had 
consensual sex is not really rape, and if consent was absent on a particular occasion, there is 
no real harm done. Contrary to this myth, the harm of rape by previous partners is well 
established (see, for example, Coker, Weston, Creson, Justice, & Blakeney, 2005). In Trial 3, 
C was allegedly raped by her husband. During the trial, DC repeatedly emphasized that D 
and C were married, referring to the ͞ŵaƌital ďed,͟ ͞ŵaƌital ƌelatioŶs,͟ ͞ŵaƌital ďedƌooŵ,͟ 
and ͞ŵaƌital hoŵe.͟ Theƌe ǁeƌe ϭϬ ƌefeƌeŶĐes iŶ all to C͛s ŵaƌital status. The Đleaƌ 
implication was that whatever had happened, this was after all a marriage and therefore it 
was not true rape. Similarly, in Trial 4, in cross-examining C and examining D, DC made 15 
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sepaƌate ƌefeƌeŶĐes to C͛s pƌeǀious seǆual ƌelatioŶship ǁith D. While ŵaƌƌiage oƌ a pƌeǀious 
relationship are clearly relevant to the issue of consent and therefore a legitimate subject 
for some cross-eǆaŵiŶatioŶ, DC, iŶ heaǀilǇ foĐusiŶg oŶ C͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith D, is puƌsuiŶg a 
further agenda and also distancing the case from the real rape stereotype. 
A related myth seen in Trial 3 is that if marital rape had indeed occurred, the wife would 
immediately depart the marital home never to return or, at the very least, abandon the 
marital bedroom until such time as she could secure her departure. Many women who have 
experienced intimate partner (sexual) violence are asked why they do not leave the abusive 
relationship (Murray, 2008; Rhodes & McKenzie, 1998). The factors associated with either 
staying or leaving are numerous and complex (see Rhodes & McKenzie, 1998, for a review). 
Indeed, Carline and Easteal (2014) emphasized that multiple forms of coercion may be 
ďƌought to ďeaƌ iŶ aďusiǀe ƌelatioŶships, ǁhiĐh ƌestƌiĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhoiĐes. IŶ Tƌial ϯ, C, aŶ 
asylum seeker, was cross-examined repeatedly in five different threads of questioning about 
why she continued to live with D at the time of the alleged rapes and why she shared the 
saŵe ďed ǁith a ͞ƌapist.͟ DC͛s ĐoŶstaŶt ƌefƌaiŶ ǁas that C ǁould haƌdlǇ haǀe ďehaǀed like this 
if she ǁas ƌeallǇ ďeiŶg aďused. C͛s failuƌe to leaǀe heƌ husďaŶd has a ďeaƌiŶg oŶ the issue of 
consent and is a legitimate matter for some cross-examination. However, in suggesting that 
this is not something that true marital rape victims do, DC was resorting to one of the fables 
about rape. It furthermore fails to acknowledge the difficulties that face immigrant women 
who may well face deportation if they leave their husbands and are therefore effectively 
trapped in abusive relationships (Carline & Easteal, 2014). 
A further myth seen in these trials denies any distinction between consenting to some 
intimate behavior and consenting to sex (Gray, 2015; Payne et al., 1999). In three trials (4, 5, 
and 7), DC emphasized that C had consented to some kissing. There is every reason for DC 
to have cross-examined C about consensual kissing in these trials but there was a further 
implication that consent to kissing effectively meant consent to sex or that C rather than D 
was to blame for what happened thereafter. 
In Trial 7, kissing preceding the alleged rape was emphasized. DC questioned C as to 
whether she agreed to being kissed by D and whether she kissed him back. C said that she 
had kissed D alďeit ƌeluĐtaŶtlǇ. DC͛s ƌespoŶse ǁas to state iŶ heƌ ĐlosiŶg speeĐh, ͞“he kissed 
hiŵ ďaĐk aŶd she kŶeǁ that kissiŶg led to otheƌ thiŶgs, Ǉet she did Ŷot ask hiŵ to leaǀe.͟ 
The issue in the case was not whether C consented to kissing but whether she consented to 
sexual intercourse. DC was implying that, to an experienced woman ͞ǁho kŶeǁ that kissiŶg 
led to otheƌ thiŶgs,͟ kissing meant that she consented to sex as well. PC, conceding that 
kissiŶg ǁas a ŵistake oŶ C͛s paƌt, dealt ǁith this iŵpliĐatioŶ ƌoďustlǇ: ͞EǀeŶ if she had a kiss 
that did Ŷot ŵeaŶ that she ǁaŶted full seǆ aŶd oƌal seǆ.͟ 
Rape myths contain rigid prescriptions as to post-rape behavior. Genuine victims are 
expected to do all they can to escape from their attacker, to preserve the evidence as a 
prelude to reporting the matter to the police, and to exhibit appropriate emotion when 
reporting the matter and in court; but the trauma of the event may affect individuals in 
different ways (e.g., Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). Despite this, post-rape behavior came under 
scrutiny in four trials (1, 5, 6, and 7). In Trial 6, for example, C showered and washed the 
sheets after the alleged rape. DC declared that this was inconsistent with the behavior of 
someone who had been sexually assaulted as she was effectively getting rid of the evidence. 
IŶ Tƌial ϳ, DC dƌeǁ the juƌǇ͛s atteŶtioŶ to C͛s deŵeaŶoƌ iŶ Đouƌt; ƌatheƌ thaŶ shoǁiŶg 
distƌess, she ǁas ͞feisty͟ aŶd ƌespoŶded ǁith ͞fiery irritation͟ to ƋuestioŶs put to heƌ iŶ 
cross-examination. The jury was asked to consider whether this was the type of woman who 
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would have submitted to rape. C explained that she submitted to D after he had put a 
cushion over her face and she feared he was going to kill her. However, the jury was being 
iŶǀited to ĐoŶĐlude that C͛s failuƌe to shoǁ appƌopƌiate distƌess iŶ Đouƌt Đast douďt oŶ the 
legitimacy of her claim. 
MǇths ƌelatiŶg to the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt͛s ĐlothiŶg ǁeƌe also fouŶd iŶ the studǇ. The ŵǇth heƌe 
is that clothing or its absence may be an indicator of consent to sex or may precipitate rape, 
so that the blame for rape lies with the complainant rather than the perpetrator (e.g., Payne 
et al., 1999). It featured strongly in Trial 6, in which C was allegedly raped by a former 
partner when she allowed him to stay over after he turned up at her flat. In cross-
examination and in her closing speech DC referred 9 times to the fact that C wore only a T-
shiƌt aŶd Ŷo uŶdeƌgaƌŵeŶts iŶ ďed. DC͛s aƌguŵeŶt ǁas suŵŵed up iŶ her closing speech: ͞If 
C ǁas telliŶg the tƌuth ǁhǇ did she go to ďed iŶ that ǁaǇ?͟ Without expressing it in so many 
words, the jury was also plainly being invited to conclude that even if she was telling the 
truth about the rape, she had only herself to blame for what happened. Yet, DC expressly 
denied to the jury that she was having recourse to ͞the NeaŶdeƌthal ďelief that, if Ǉou go to 
ďed ǁith a ďaƌe ďottoŵ, Ǉou aƌe askiŶg foƌ it.͟ 
The final myth identified in these trials focuses on the defendant, and suggests that 
ƌapists aƌe ideŶtifiaďle ďeĐause theǇ aƌe ͞otheƌ,͟ diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ Ŷoƌŵal ŵeŶ aŶd Ŷot ͞the 
ŵaŶ Ŷeǆt dooƌ.͟ Hoǁeǀeƌ, ŵost peƌpetƌatoƌs aƌe kŶoǁŶ to the ǀiĐtiŵ ;MJ, HO, & ON“, 
ϮϬϭϯͿ, aŶd Ŷot ŶotiĐeaďlǇ ͞diffeƌeŶt͟ fƌoŵ otheƌ ŵeŶ. This ŵǇth Đƌopped up in two trials (4 
aŶd ϳͿ. IŶ Tƌial ϰ, the idea that seǆ offeŶdeƌs aƌe ͞otheƌ͟ ǁas a ĐoŶǀeŶieŶt ŵǇth foƌ DC 
when defending a seemingly respectable man. D had been in the army for many years and 
was employed as a part-time teacher. There were in all 13 sepaƌate ƌefeƌeŶĐes to D͛s good 
character by DC and the judge. In her closing speech DC summed it up by saying that the 
jury had to decide ͞Whetheƌ D ǁas a ƌespeĐtaďle ďut sillǇ oldeƌ ŵaŶ ǁho had had his head 
turned by a gothic redhead or whether he was a seǆ offeŶdeƌ,͟ clearly suggesting that he 
could not be both. 
In Trial 7, DC was faced with the difficult task of defending a man with a previous 
conviction for a sex offence, which had been disclosed to the court. DC sought to show that 
that this conviction was a one-off which did not make him a sex offender. Had he been so, 
DC argued, he would have attacked C in the street and the attack would have been rushed. 
But, as it ǁas, the alleged ƌape had takeŶ plaĐe iŶ the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s hoŵe aŶd did Ŷot iŶǀolǀe a 
quick attaĐk. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, D͛s ďehaǀioƌ did Ŷot ŵatĐh that of a tƌue seǆ offeŶdeƌ. 
In Theme 3, myths associated with the particular facts of the case are operationalized. 
There may well be good reason to cross-examine C about the facts in question but this 
becomes problematic when the jury is, through repeated questioning and suggestion, 
invited to fall back on the stereotypes and conclude that these facts lead to the 
mythological conclusion. 
Challenging the Stereotypes 
In an adversarial trial, the use of rape mythology by the defense can be challenged by 
prosecution witnesses, by PC, and by the judge. The extent to which this happened in the 
present study will now be considered. 
Prosecution challenges. Not all complainants in the study were afraid to take issue with the 
myths used by the defense. In Trial 7, for example, where DC put it to C that she had made a 
false allegation motivated by a desire to get close to a male friend, she retorted, ͞The idea 
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that I would put myself through this in an attention seekiŶg eǆeƌĐise is uŶďelieǀaďle.͟ 
However, such a robust reply from a complainant was unusual. 
There were comparatively few attempts by PC to challenge the myths. However, such an 
attempt was made in Trial 6, which involved the alleged rape by a former partner. As noted 
aďoǀe, the defeŶse iŶ this Đase had ŵuĐh to saǇ aďout C͛s Ŷight attiƌe. PC iŶ heƌ ĐlosiŶg 
speech directly and skillfully addressed this issue: 
Rape does not always involve somebody being dragged off the street into the bushes. 
Rapes happen in relationships; they are committed by people you trust. Was C not 
entitled to trust this person with whom she had been in a relationship for 6 years? She 
knew him really well and felt that it was ok for him to be in her house. He had never 
done anything like this before so she felt safe. Her getting into bed with no knickers did 
not mean anything. It did not mean to him, as he had told the court, that sex was on the 
agenda. 
Similarly, in Trial 7, PC directly addressed the stereotypes in a case where C had allowed a 
stranger into her flat and had on previous occasions had sex with strangers: 
That night she did not want sex. She was entitled to say that she did not want sex. Even 
if she had a kiss that did not mean that she wanted full sex and oral sex. A woman was 
entitled to say no and she did say no. 
In these trials, there are a few instances of well-constructed challenges to rape myths. 
However, despite the number and variety of myths used by DC and the opportunity to 
challenge them in cross-examination of D, and in re-examination of C, such challenges were 
rare. PC were therefore missing opportunities to warn the jury against drawing conclusions 
based on generalized and false assumptions about rape. 
Judicial interventions and directions. The sheer number of myth invocations in the course of 
the eight trials meant there was ample opportunity for judges to tackle some of them by 
intervening where cross-examination of C became oppressive or irrelevant and in their jury 
directions. Myth-related judicial interventions were rare. But in Trial 7, DC, invoking the myth 
that false allegations are very common because many complainants are mentally ill, 
questioned C about suffering depression in the past and whether she had attempted suicide 
as a teenager. The judge iŶteƌǀeŶed saǇiŶg, ͞What͛s that got to do ǁith the pƌiĐe of eggs? If 
Ǉou ǁaŶt to puƌsue that, I ǁaŶt to heaƌ the legal aƌguŵeŶt.͟ Undeterred, DC then put it to C 
that she had the tendency to be low and depressed. 
The Crown Court Bench Book4 (JSB, 2010) provides a non-exhaustive list of commonly 
held and mistaken assumptions about rape. These include the following: C wore provocative 
clothing, therefore she must have wanted sex; C got drunk in male company, therefore she 
must have been prepared for sex; a complainant in a relationship with the alleged attacker 
is likely to have consented; rape takes place between strangers; rape does not take place 
without physical resistance from the victim; if it is rape, there must be injuries; a person 
who has been sexually assaulted reports it as soon as possible; a person who has been 
sexually assaulted remembers events consistently. 
The BeŶĐh Book also pƌoǀides a seƌies of illustƌatiǀe diƌeĐtioŶs, ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞IllustƌatioŶs,͟ 
for judges to use if they so choose when directing the jury to correct the listed mistaken 
assumptions (for a critique, see Temkin, 2010). The first Illustration concerns avoiding 
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judgments based on stereotypes of the nature of rape and the type of person who can be a 
rapist or the victim of rape. The ƌest aƌe geaƌed to the folloǁiŶg: ͞aǀoidiŶg assuŵptioŶs ǁheŶ 
the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt aŶd defeŶdaŶt aƌe kŶoǁŶ to oŶe aŶotheƌ,͟ ͞effeĐt of tƌauŵa oŶ deŵeaŶoƌ iŶ 
eǀideŶĐe,͟ ͞late ƌepoƌtiŶg,͟ ͞aďseŶĐe of foƌĐe oƌ the thƌeat of foƌĐe,͟ ͞soŵe ĐoŶseŶsual 
activity—no overt force—laĐk of ƌesistaŶĐe͟ ;iŶĐludiŶg laĐk of iŶjuƌǇͿ, ͞pƌoǀoĐatiǀe dƌess—
hard drinking—flirtation—pƌeǀious seǆual ƌelatioŶship,͟ ͞the defeŶdaŶt͛s asseƌtioŶ of otheƌ 
;aŶd ďetteƌͿ oppoƌtuŶities foƌ ĐoŶseŶsual aĐtiǀitǇ,͟ aŶd ͞iŶĐoŶsisteŶt ĐoŵplaiŶts.͟ In six out of 
the eight trials (Trial 2 did not reach the summing-up stage) in this study, stereotypes were 
utilized by the defense, which could have been addressed using these Illustrations. 
In Trial 1, three stereotypes were invoked by the defense none of which were clearly covered 
ďǇ the IllustƌatioŶs. The judge did, hoǁeǀeƌ, ƌespoŶd to DC͛s ĐhaƌaĐteƌ assassiŶatioŶ of the 
ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt. He said that the juƌǇ ŵight peƌĐeiǀe C to ďe ͞tƌouďlesoŵe aŶd tƌouďliŶg,͟ but that 
the jury should deal with the hard evideŶĐe, aŶd that ͞EǀeŶ people ǁho͛ǀe ďehaǀed ďadlǇ iŶ the 
past aƌe eŶtitled to the pƌoteĐtioŶ of the laǁ.͟ 
In Trial 3, six myths were utilized by the defense. The judge used the three available 
Illustrations—͞aǀoidiŶg assuŵptioŶs ǁheŶ the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt aŶd defendant are known to 
oŶe aŶotheƌ,͟ ͞laĐk of ƌesistaŶĐe,͟ aŶd ͞late ƌepoƌtiŶg͟—and did so most effectively. He 
said that the issue was whether C consented to sexual intercourse. The fact that they were 
married did not create a legal obligation on her part to consent. There was no obligation to 
fight or scream when not consenting, and indeed there might be good reason for not doing 
so—in this case, C had said that she feared her daughter might hear what was happening. 
He went on to say that the jury had to be careful when considering delay. They had to bear 
in mind that there could be a reason why a woman did not immediately tell the police or a 
friend. Reticence could be very understandable, for example, C needed a roof over her head 
and funds to live off. In this case, delay was a material consideration that the jury had to 
think about. 
In Trial 4, six myths were utilized by the defense. There were 15 references to the fact 
that D aŶd C ǁeƌe foƌŵeƌ paƌtŶeƌs, ŵuĐh ǁas ŵade of D͛s aƌŵǇ ďaĐkgƌouŶd aŶd good 
character, and myths relating to kissing and delay in reporting were also invoked. The 
Illustrations on previous sexual relationship, who can be a rapist, some consensual activity, 
and late reporting were thus available, but the judge chose to give no judicial directions on 
stereotypes at all. 
In Trial 5, the defense used five myths of which three were covered by the Illustrations on 
͞late ƌepoƌtiŶg,͟ ͞soŵe ĐoŶseŶsual aĐtiǀitǇ,͟ aŶd ͞deŵeaŶoƌ iŶ eǀideŶĐe.͟ “oŵe ƌefeƌeŶĐe 
was made to two of them. The judge said that if the jury found there was a late complaint; 
they had to consider what the reasons for this were. Using the language of the Illustration, 
he said, ͞a late ĐoŵplaiŶt is Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ a false ĐoŵplaiŶt.͟ This phrasing suggests that 
the late complaint might well have been a false complaint. The judge also gave a direction 
ƌegaƌdiŶg C͛s ŵaŶifest distƌess iŶ Đouƌt, duƌiŶg the poliĐe iŶteƌǀieǁ aŶd ǁheŶ ƌepoƌtiŶg the 
matter to friends, which was referred to by the prosecution. He said that it was for the jury 
to decide whether such distress was genuine or feigned. If they decided it was genuine, they 
must decide whether it was related to what she had alleged had happened to her. It might 
be thought that, in the form they were given, these directions would have served if anything 
to increase skepticism about the complainant. 
In Trial 6, seven myths were invoked. There were three relevant Illustrations: those 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ͞aǀoidiŶg assuŵptioŶs ǁheŶ the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt aŶd defeŶdaŶt aƌe kŶoǁŶ to oŶe 
aŶotheƌ,͟ ͞pƌoǀoĐatiǀe dƌess,͟ aŶd ͞laĐk of iŶjuƌǇ.͟ The judge ŵade ƌefeƌeŶĐe to all thƌee 
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alďeit ǀeƌǇ ďƌieflǇ. Befoƌe doiŶg so, he ƌepeated Hale͛s Ŷotoƌious diĐtuŵ: ͞“eǆual allegatioŶs 
aƌe easǇ allegatioŶs to ŵake ďut diffiĐult to ƌefute.͟ As to C͛s laĐk of uŶdeƌgaƌŵeŶts in bed, 
which the defense had heavily emphasized, he commented that if it was the automatic 
assuŵptioŶ of a ŵaŶ that it ǁas ͞gaŵe oŶ͟ if she ǁas iŶ ďed ǁith Ŷo kŶiĐkeƌs, theŶ it ǁould 
also be the assumption of a mature woman. In other words, the judge was suggesting that C 
either knew that D would think she was consenting or should have known. If she did not 
actually consent, she was to blame for what happened. But he added that the jury had to be 
careful about making assumptions. They had to consider what evidence in this case was 
relevant. 
In Trial 7, the defense resorted to six separate myths five of which were dealt with by the 
IllustƌatioŶs, ͞laĐk of ƌesistaŶĐe,͟ ͞aǀoidiŶg judgŵeŶts ďased oŶ steƌeotǇpes as to ǁhat kiŶd 
of peƌsoŶ ŵaǇ ďe a ƌapist,͟ ͞deŵeaŶoƌ iŶ Đouƌt,͟ ͞seǆual histoƌǇ,͟ aŶd ͞soŵe ĐoŶseŶsual 
aĐtiǀitǇ.͟ The judge adapted the last tǁo of these IllustƌatioŶs. He addƌessed the ŵǇth 
relating to some consensual activity with admirable clarity: 
A ǁoŵaŶ is eŶtitled to ͞sŶog͟ a stƌaŶgeƌ aŶd theŶ saǇ ͞That͛s eŶough: that͛s as faƌ as I 
aŵ goiŶg.͟ EǀeŶ if theǇ ǁeƌe shaƌiŶg ĐaŶŶaďis aŶd dƌiŶkiŶg, that did Ŷot ŵeaŶ that D 
had a license to continue to do whatever he wanted sexually without her consent. 
The judge͛s diƌeĐtioŶ oŶ seǆual histoƌǇ, eǀideŶĐe of ǁhich emerged during the trial, was 
again exemplary: 
The manner in which C gave evidence made it clear that she was sexually experienced 
before the incident. This is not a court of morals; it is a court of law. If someone chose 
to have sexual intercourse with a hundred people, that should have no bearing on the 
juƌǇ͛s ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of ǁhat happeŶed that Ŷight. A peƌsoŶ Đould ĐoŶseŶt to seǆ ǁith a 
hundred people but if he or she said no to the 101st, then that was No . . . The fact that 
she had previous sexual partners and that some of these might have been strangers 
was irrelevant to the issue of consent on the night. 
In Trial 8, C was a 16-year-old allegedly raped by another teenager. The defense focused 
heavily on the lack of resistance myth for which an Illustration is available. There were no 
fewer than 14 references and questions as to why she did not shout for help, seek to 
escape, or seek assistance from the police who were nearby. The judge said no more to the 
jury than that it was unnecessary to prove resistance and then simply repeated what C had 
said without further comment. He went on to give a general direction on stereotypes based 
on the first Illustration. However, without relating it in any way to the case in hand, the jury 
may well have been baffled as to what he was getting at. 
The list of myths mentioned in the Bench Book is expressed to be non-exhaustive (JSB, 
2010). The judges in this study, for the most part, chose not to stray beyond the list to 
address other myths. At the same time, many of the myths specifically mentioned in the 
Bench Book were not properly addressed. The Bench Book is emphatic that there is no need 
for the judge to caution the jury about myths and, if a choice is made to address a particular 
myth, this must be done in a fair and balanced way and in consultation with both advocates. 
Across the seven cases in which there was a summing-up, myths were used 34 times by the 
defense and there were 19 opportunities to make use of an Illustration to warn the jury 
about specific myths. Eleven such warnings were given (see Table 2) with one further 
general warning about stereotypes. But of the 11, at least four were perfunctory and, if the 
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purpose of a myth direction is to correct misleading assumptions, several more were of no 
use in that regard. While the judges in Trials 3 and 7 dealt very effectively and fairly with the 
stereotypes, in the remaining five trials, they were handled with considerably less 
assurance. It is concerning that in Trial 4 where the defense drew heavily upon six myths, 
the judge chose to say nothing whatever about any of them and that in Trial 6 the judge 
soleŵŶlǇ ƌepeated Hale͛s iŶfaŵous diĐtuŵ. It is also less thaŶ ƌeassuƌiŶg that iŶ Tƌial ϱ the 
myths were addressed in such a way as conceivably to augment skepticism about the 
complainant. 
The only convictions in the sample were in Trials 1, 3, and 7. In any trial, there are likely to 
ďe a Ŷuŵďeƌ of faĐtoƌs that ĐoŶtƌiďute to the juƌǇ͛s ǀeƌdiĐt. IŶ the aďseŶĐe of aĐĐess to the 
juƌǇ͛s deliďeƌatioŶs,5 it cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty how much the 
rape myths mobilized in the trials influenced the verdicts, how much the challenges to them 
had any effect, or what the significance was of other variables. Certainly, in Trial 1, the 
evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and the conviction was therefore to be 
expected and, in Trial 3, C was a particularly credible witness. It has been argued by Bohner 
et al. (2009) that, as schemas, rape myths are likely to provide an attitudinal scaffolding 
within which the evidence is interpreted. If this is so, it follows that effective challenges to 
these myths may undermine that attitudinal scaffolding. In Trials 3 and 7, the judges͛ 
excellent directions on myths may therefore have had some impact on the jury and, in Trial 
7, both C and PC also challenged the myths and this may have had some effect. Conversely, 
in the cases where there was an acquittal, there were no effective directions from the 
judge. IŶdeed, iŶ Tƌial ϲ, the judge͛s suŵŵiŶg-up, if anything, would have reinforced the 
rape myths that were used by the defense in the trial. The value of myth directions, properly 
delivered, does, of course, transcend their likely effect in any particular trial as they send a 
public message about the dangers of false assumptions about rape. 
For the most part, the judges did not employ the stilted language used in the Illustrations 
but preferred to adapt and simplify them. This practice is to be welcomed and is given full 
license in the Bench Book itself (JSB, 2010). The list of myths used in the trials as set out in 
Table 2 demonstrates that the Illustrations are far from covering the full range. It may well 
be that some are unsuited to a direction. However, some more Illustrations to cover, for 
example, responses to marital rape including failure to leave the marital bed or home, post-
rape behavior, and previous allegations of rape would undoubtedly be helpful. 
Conclusion 
The extensive modern literature on rape myths—be it psychological or socio-legal—has so 
far lacked sufficient grounding in the actual evidence of myth usage in the courtroom. As an 
observational study of practice in the courts, this study makes a novel contribution to 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ƌape ŵǇths aƌe used aŶd ĐhalleŶged iŶ the ͞ƌeal ǁoƌld.͟ Its 
originality lies in its delineation of the different ways in which myths are deployed to 
manipulate jurors. Thus, rape myths are seen to serve a variety of different functions, 
supplying DC with a range of options in seeking to influence juries. The study also suggests 
the possibility that skillful challenges to rape myths may help to counter their influence. 
Given the small number of trials, generalizable claims cannot be made. Further large-scale 
observational research, both in the United Kingdom and in other jurisdictions with 
adversarial systems, would be useful to generate quantitative data, which would provide 
stronger evidence of the nature and extent of the myths used and the effectiveness of 
prosecution and judicial challenges to the myths. However, the finding that a wide 
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repertoire of myths was pressed into service by the defense in the observed trials—five or 
more myths in the majority of trials—suggests that the use of rape mythology is still well 
entrenched. Nor is there any indication in this study that any of the well-worn myths about 
rape have fallen into desuetude. Indeed, rape mythology would appear to be a key defense 
tool regardless of the nature of the alleged assault or the overall strength of the prosecution 
case. Given the wealth of knowledge about the likely impact of stereotyping on jurors 
Temkin & Krahé, 2008), this should cause some concern. The Angiolini (2015) review found 
that prosecutors failed consistently to identify rape myths and concluded that the handling 
of rape cases by the Criminal Justice System remains problematic. 
It is disappointing that, on the whole, myth usage by the defense was insufficiently 
challenged by the prosecution although there were a few instances of counsel employing 
skillful and robust counter-arguments. Similarly, while several judges in the study addressed 
the myths very fairly and adeptly, others failed to give adequate or indeed any warning 
about them or to make use of the Illustrations. 
The study also suggests that s.41, which places strict limits on the use of sexual history 
evidence in court, is still not doing the job it is supposed to do. Moreover, if Trial 1 is 
anything to go by, s.100 may also not be providing much protection for complainants from 
over-reaching cross-eǆaŵiŶatioŶ aďout theiƌ ͞ďad ĐhaƌaĐteƌ.͟ GiǀeŶ the Ŷatuƌe of the 
adversarial system, it may be too much to expect defense barristers to curb their ways. 
However, at the very least, they must be held to account for flagrant breaches of the law 
such as in England and Wales when s.41 is ignored. 
All these findings suggest that further training for prosecutors and judges is necessary. 
The Angiolini review recommended that more training programs for prosecutors be 
introduced urgently to enhance rape myth recognition and it is suggested here that such 
training should be extended to all barristers who appear in sexual assault cases involving 
both adults and children. Training about rape mythology could usefully take the form of 
encouraging awareness of the subtle ways in which myths are invoked and the misleading 
assumptions that arise from them, as well as enabling prosecution counsel to develop 
effective counter-narratives to those employed by the defense. As noted above, there is 
some excellent prosecutorial and judicial practice in this area that could be put to good use 
in training programs. 
It is disturbing that false ideas about rape played such a prominent role in these eight 
21st-century trials. If the adversarial system and jury trials countenance the use of any tricks 
or falsities in the interests of playing the game and defending the accused, then serious 
questions must be asked about its moral validity and the extent to which it is capable of 
giving protection to victims. It is suggested here that the way forward lies in further and 
deeper education of prosecuting authorities and judges about rape myths and their malign 
effect. A reconsideration of the role of experts in this context would also be of value. 
Moreover, powers exist in many jurisdictions to challenge the use of rape myths in the 
courtroom in a variety of different ways. It is high time these were fully operationalized. 
Notes 
1. IŶ EŶglaŶd aŶd Wales, ͞ďaƌƌisteƌs͟ aƌe laǁǇeƌs tƌaiŶed to practice as advocates in court. 
2. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is in charge of all public prosecutions in England 
and Wales. 
3. Serious offences are dealt with by judge and jury in the Crown Courts 
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4. The Crown Court Bench Book is the official handbook for judges presiding over criminal 
trials in the Crown Courts in England and Wales. 
5. Access to jury discussions in England and Wales is prevented by the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981. 
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